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Constitutional barriers to congressional reform 
JOHN GREABE 
Constitutional Connections 
A mericans celebrate our Consti-tution as a beacon that can guide us through difficult situa-
tions. And justly so. But at times, the 
Constitution also has stood as a bar-
rier to necessary reform. 
Take, for example, the mess that is 
Congress. Bipartisanship and regular 
order· are things of the past. A senator 
or representative's willingness to 
work with someone across the aisle 
can trigger a career-ending primary 
challenge. Highly irnpactful health 
care and tax bills have been written 
in secret and rushed to votes without 
public hearings or, seemingly, regard 
for public opinion. Congressmen have 
used tax dollars to settle sexual ha-
rassment charges. 
Little wonder, then, that 
Congress's approval rating stood at 
13 percent in November, according to 
Gallup. Moreover, 2017 will mark the 
eighth straight year in which 
Congress's average annual approval 
rating has fallen below 20 percent. 
What has caused Congress to be-
come ever more dysfunctional in re-
cent years? It is difficult to say, but 
many blame the astonishing surge of 
money in politics and the increased 
sophistication of partisan gerryman-
dering. The former tends to render 
Congress more beholden to special 
interests than to the collective inter-
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est. The latter tends to pro-
mote partisanship and deter 
members of Congress from 
engaging in compromise. 
So what can be done? Un-
fortunately for those unhappy 
with the status quo, a divided 
Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Constitution to 
place significant constraints 
on some of the more obvious 
pathways to reform: term lim-
its, campaign-finance regula-
tions and restrictions on parti-
san gerrymandering. 
1. Term limits. Advocates 
for term limits - restrictions 
on the number of terms sena-
tors and representatives can 
serve - argue that they could 
help to "drain the swamp." 
Term limits would ensure 
that, at any given time, 
Congress would be staffed by 
a number of members who 
cannot run for re-election and 
therefore would not be preoc-
cupied with raising money for 
their next campaign. More-
over, members who know they 
are leaving might feel freer to 
stand on principle and to buck 
the donor class. Term limits 
also would ensure that 
Congress would more fre-
quently be refreshed with new 
members. 
By the mid-1990s, 23 states 
had enacted laws placing 
term limits on members of 
Congress. But in US Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton 
(1995), the Supreme Court 
split 5-4 to hold that states 
cannot impose qualifications 
for service in Congress (in-
cluding term limits) beyond 
those specified in the Consti-
tution. 
The court concluded that 
allowing additional regulation 
would work an unconstitu-
tional transfer of sovereign 
power from the people - who 
may elect their preferred con-
gressional candidates subject 
only to constitutional citizen-
ship, age and residency re-
quirements - to the states. 
2. Campaign-finance reg-
ulations. Federal and state 
legislation has sought to re-
duce the impact of money in 
politics. Provisions have been 
enacted regulating, among 
other things, campaign ex-
penditures, campaign contri-
butions, corporate and union 
support for campaigns, and 
the timing and veracity of po-
litical advertisements. Mea-
sures also have been taken to 
encourage the public financ-
ing of elections and to require 
public disclosure of the 
sources of certain political 
spending. 
In a series of decisions, the 
Supreme Court has struck 
down many campaign-finance 
regulations as inconsistent 
with the First Amendment's 
free-speech guarantee. In ar-
guably the most important of 
these rulings, Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commis-
sion (2010), the court ac-
knowledged that legislatures 
may enact campaign finance 
regulations to combat "cor-
ruption" without violating the 
First Amendment. 
But dividing 5-4, the court 
narrowly defined corruption 
in terms of a quid pro quo -
that is, a direct exchange of 
donor dollars for a specific 
legislative vote - and held that 
"ingratiation and access ... are 
not corruption." As a conse-
quence, the court under-
stands the First Amendment 
to protect the influence-ped-
dling that is so pervasive and, 
many would say, corrosive to 
the public interest. 
3. Limits on partisan ger-
rymandering. Partisan gerry-
mandering - the practice of 
redrawing of voting district 
lines by state legislatures to 
entrench the political majority 
after each census - has made 
most congressional districts 
politically monolithic. Repre-
sentatives serving such dis-
tricts are incentivized to place 
party over country and be-
come vulnerable to their ex-
treme flank if they are seen as 
insufficiently partisan. In such 
an environment, compromise 
becomes next to impossible. 
Some states have sought to 
reduce partisan gerryman-
dering by creating bipartisan 
redistricting commissions. 
And two years ago, in Arizona 
State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Districting 
Commission (2015), the 
Supreme Court split 5-4 to up-
hold the constitutionality of 
such commissions. In doing 
so, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the Constitution 
assigns the task of redistrict-
ing to state legislatures alone. 
Moreover, the court 
presently has under advise-
ment two cases that raise the 
question whether court-or-
dered limits on partisan ger-
rymandering might be consti-
tutionally permissible in some 
circumstances. 
But no court order striking 
down a partisan gerrymander 
has ever been permitted to 
stand. So, while reformers 
concerned with the issue have 
a bit more reason for hope 
than those who favor term 
limits or greater campaign-fi-
nance regulation, the battle 
remains uphill. 
In a famous dissenting 
opinion handed down in 1932, 
Justice Louis Brandeis ar-
gued that the Supreme Court 
should not lightly interpret 
the Constitution to prohibit 
legislative responses to 
crises. 
He wrote: "It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single coura-
geous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory, 
and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the coun-
try." 
Justice Brandeis was ad-
monishing his fellow justices 
to permit the states to try out 
policies designed to counter-
act the effects of the Great 
Depression. 
But his point can be gener-
alized to apply to efforts by 
Congress to reform itself as 
well. And it is a point that the 
Supreme Court might well re-
flect upon as it watches our 
national institutions take on 
water. 
(John Grea.be teaches con-
stitutional law and related 
subjects at the University of 
New Hampshire School of 
Law. He also serves on the 
board of trustees of the New 
Hampshire Institute for 
Civics Education.) 
